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acknowledged.1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
New Keynesian macroeconomic models have become a workhorse for studying
a variety of monetary policy issues in closed economy environments. An
important component of this e⁄ort has been the development of the idea that
equilibrium determinacy and learnability may be signi￿cantly in￿ uenced by
monetary policy choices.1 Recently, simple extensions of the New Keynesian
model to open economy environments have been developed. Our primary
concern in this paper is to provide an analysis of the extent to which the
￿ndings concerning determinacy and learnability for the closed economy New
Keynesian framework may be altered when open economy considerations are
brought to bear. Our learnability criterion is that of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
Our approach to this question is to adopt a simple framework for a two-
country world due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). This framework
provides one straightforward extension of the New Keynesian model to two
countries and allows comparison to the more common single country and
small open economy analyses as special cases. We focus on the two polar cases
of ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates, and ask the question how determinacy
and international monetary policy transmission are a⁄ected by the exchange
rate regime.
1.2 Main ￿ndings
The main ￿ndings under ￿ exible exchange rates are as follows. Instrument
rules which are focussed on domestic in￿ ation and domestic output gaps lead
to world determinacy and learnability conditions which must be met in each
economy independently of whether they are met in the partner economy. For
targeting rules, this result has a natural counterpart when policymakers in
1See, for instance, Woodford (2003), Bullard and Mitra (2002), Bullard (2006), Evans
and Honkapohja (2003a,b), and Preston (2003).
1each country pursue non-cooperative optimal policy under discretion. The
choice of how to implement the optimality condition stemming from the
minimization problem faced by the monetary authorities can easily be made
inappropriately, leading to indeterminacy and expectational instability.
On the other hand, instrument rules which include responses to inter-
national economic conditions induce international feedback between the two
economies even when there would otherwise be no such feedback. The separa-
bility of conditions between countries breaks down. This second result again
has a natural counterpart in the case of targeting rules, in the situation where
the two countries agree to try to pursue the gains from cooperation which
may exist in the model. Implementation will again be an issue.
We also ￿nd that, if properly implemented, a ￿ exible exchange rate regime
has attractive insulation properties relative to a ￿xed exchange rate regime
(here modelled as an exchange rate peg).
We conclude that determinacy and learnability considerations can alter
the evaluation of monetary policy options in an international context.
1.3 Recent related literature
Batini, Levine, Justiniano and Pearlman (2005) study indeterminacy in a
two-country New Keynesian model. Their focus is on the relationship be-
tween many-period forward-looking in￿ ation forecast rules and indetermi-
nacy conditions. We do not consider rules in this class in this paper. When
forward-looking rules are considered here, they arise from the implementa-
tion of certain optimality considerations and do not involve forecasts more
than one period into the future.
De Fiore and Liu (2005) study indeterminacy in a small open New Key-
nesian economy. Their model is somewhat di⁄erent from the one we study.
They conclude that whether a given policy rule can deliver determinacy will
depend on the degree of openness in the small economy, a result we also
obtain.
A number of papers study classic open economy issues in the New Keyne-
sian framework. Pappa (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2004), for exam-
2ple, study the gains from monetary policy coordination. Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005) analyze ￿ self-oriented￿or ￿ inward-looking￿national monetary policies
in frameworks related to the one studied here. While touching on some re-
lated themes, these papers do not focus on the determinacy and learnability
issues we emphasize.
Ellison, Sarno, and Vilmunen (2004) study central bank learning in the
two-country world of Aghion, Becchetta, and Banerjee (2001). They al-
low fundamental parameters in the economy to follow Markov switching
processes, and central banks update their inference concerning the current
regime via Bayes rule.
Zanna (2004) studies determinacy and learnability in the small open econ-
omy case for a model due to Uribe (2003) which is again somewhat di⁄erent
from the one we study.2 Zanna (2004) contains results on learnable sunspot
equilibria under common factor representations, a topic we have not ad-
dressed here.
Working in parallel with us, Llosa and Tuesta (2005) study determinacy
and learnability in a version of the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) model we
use. Whereas we emphasize the two country model they analyze the model
from the point of view of the small open economy. Llosa and Tuesta (2005)
study instrument rules more extensively than we do, including di⁄erent forms
of Taylor-type rules as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). The Llosa and Tuesta
(2005) discussion of domestic in￿ ation versus consumer price index in￿ ation
in the policy rule parallels some of our analysis, and we compare our results
to theirs when appropriate.
1.4 Organization
We begin by presenting the basic model environment in the next section.
We take up our analysis of the e⁄ects of policy on determinacy and learn-
ability by ￿rst considering instrument rules under ￿ exible exchange rates,
simple descriptions of policy that allow us to develop some basic results
2Bullard and Schaling (2006) also discuss purchasing power parity rules.
3and intuition, especially concerning ￿country by country￿determinacy and
learnability conditions. Policymakers using rules in this class might break
the natural separability of country analysis in the model should they decide
to react in part to international variables when setting monetary policy, and
we develop a version of this situation. We then turn to targeting rules (also
under ￿ exible exchange rates), whereby the policy rule is inferred from an
optimization exercise undertaken by each monetary authority. The nature of
the optimization exercise will be important for our ￿ndings. The ￿nal por-
tion of the paper takes up certain asymmetric situations associated with ￿xed
exchange rates. One of these is the case of one country pegging its exchange
rate to a second country which is following an independent monetary policy.
We discuss our ￿ndings and directions for future research in the conclusion.
2 A two-country New Keynesian model
2.1 Overview
We employ the two-country model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). This
is one natural extension of the closed economy New Keynesian model to
the open economy case in which two large economies are interacting, and so
it provides a good starting point for the analysis of determinacy issues in
the open economy. The model has a natural separation between countries
that Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) discuss in some detail. Roughly, af-
ter making certain adjustments to parameters accounting for the degree of
openness of each economy, this version of the open economy New Keynesian
model is qualitatively the same as the standard, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999)-style closed economy New Keynesian model. We exploit this feature
extensively in this paper.
2.2 Environment
We can provide only a brief discussion of the microfoundations of the model
here￿ interested readers should consult Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
4The two countries are labelled H and F: Preferences and technologies are
the same in both countries. Each country has an intermediate goods sector
which is subject to a Calvo-style sticky price friction along with a ￿nal goods
sector which is competitive. Only ￿nal goods are traded. Preferences for




F;t, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
The parameter ￿ is often described as the degree of openness, because as
￿ ! 0 (￿ ! 1) the foreign (home) economy becomes vanishingly small, and
all goods are produced and consumed at home (abroad). The model economy
is log-linearized about a steady state and described by
~ yt = Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
o [rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rrt]; (1)
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿o~ yt + ut (2)
where ￿o = ￿ (￿ ￿ 1); ￿o = ￿ ￿ ￿o; ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿o + ￿; ￿o = ￿￿; and ￿ =
[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)]=￿: The variable ~ yt represents the domestic output gap, ￿t
represents domestic producer price in￿ ation, and rt represents the short term
nominal interest rate. The term rrt is the domestic natural real interest rate
(conditional on foreign output) given by
rrt = ￿oEt￿￿ yt+1 + ￿oEt￿y
?
t+1
where ￿￿ yt+1 is the rate of growth of the domestic natural level of output and
￿y?
t+1 is the rate of growth of the level of foreign output. The term ut follows
an AR(1) process given by ut = ￿ut￿1 + ￿u;t;with 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; where ￿u;t is
an i:i:d: stochastic term.3 The equations (1) and (2) have ￿ve fundamental
parameters: The household discount factor ￿; a parameter controlling the
curvature in preferences over consumption ￿; a parameter controlling the
curvature in preferences over leisure ￿; the mass of agents or degree of open-
ness ￿; and the probability that a ￿rm will not be able to change its price
today ￿; which we sometimes refer to as the degree of price stickiness. The
foreign economy is described analogously as
~ y
?





























o = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1); ￿?
o = ￿ ￿ ￿?
o; ￿? = ￿ ￿ ￿?
o + ￿; ￿
?
o = ￿￿?; and
￿ = [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)]=￿: In these equations ~ y?
t is the foreign output gap, ￿?
t
is foreign producer price in￿ ation, and r?
t is the foreign nominal interest rate.
The term rr?












t+1 is the rate of growth of the foreign natural level of output and
￿yt+1 is the rate of growth of the level of domestic output. The term u?
t is




with 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; where ￿?
u;t is an i:i:d: stochastic term.
In equations (3) and (4), the fundamental parameters ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿; and ￿ are
all the same as in equations (1) and (2), re￿ ecting the maintained assumption
that the preferences and technologies in the two economies are the same. The
only di⁄erence is that ￿ in (1) and (2) has been replaced by 1￿￿ in (3) and
(4).
The nominal exchange rate et obeys consumer price index-based, or ￿ag-
gregate￿purchasing power parity, and is given by
et = (pC;t ￿ p
?
C;t)
= (pt + ￿st) ￿ (p
?
t ￿ f(1 ￿ ￿)stg)
= pt ￿ p
?
t + st
where pt is shorthand for the domestic producer price level pH;t, p?
t is short-
hand for the foreign producer price level p?
F;t, and where pC;t and p?
C;t represent
the home and foreign consumer price index, respectively. Finally, a simple
expression links the terms of trade to movements in the output gap:
st = (~ yt ￿ ~ y
?
t) + (￿ yt ￿ ￿ y
?
t) (5)
= (~ yt ￿ ~ y
?
t) + ￿ st
where ￿ st is the natural level of the terms of trade.
6An advantage of this formulation is that the open economy e⁄ects in this
model come through the composite parameters ￿o and ￿?
o: The special cases
where either ￿ ! 0 or ￿ ! 1 respectively place all the mass of agents in the
home or the foreign economy. In these cases, the home or foreign economy
behaves as if it were an isolated, closed economy, while the partner behaves as
if it were a small open economy.4 An isolated, closed economy corresponds to
the ones that have been extensively analyzed in the New Keynesian literature.
2.3 Determinacy issues
As pointed out by Jensen (2002), since Sargent and Wallace (1975) showed
that an interest rate peg rendered the price level indeterminate in a ratio-
nal expectations IS-LM-AS model, there has been a lot of research in the
issue of designing monetary policy in order to secure determinate rational
expectations equilibria.
The model above is one where an interest rate peg would also lead to
indeterminate equilbrium. To understand some of the intuition for this re-
sult, consider a sunspot-driven increase in in￿ ation expectations, Et￿t+1. As
this does not a⁄ect the nominal interest rate rt, the real interest rate falls.
This stimulates demand and the output gap via equation (1). Through the
interaction of the IS and Phillips curves, this implies an increase in current
in￿ ation that is larger than the increase in expected in￿ ation. As the in-
crease in in￿ ation expectations is of arbitrary size, one cannot pin down a
unique non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium (REE). The economy
is consequently vulnerable to expectations-driven ￿ uctuations, a.k.a. sunspot
￿ uctuations.
To ensure determinacy and thus exclude the potential for ine¢ cient, self-
ful￿lling ￿ uctuations, some restrictions are typically required on the behavior
of the nominal interest rate. In the remainder of the paper we will analyze the
model under di⁄erent scenarios for how these interest rates are determined
by policymakers. We will begin with a simple speci￿cation that produces
4Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2002) analyze the case of a
small open economy using a similar framework.
7simple intuition, and later move to more complicated optimal policy speci-
￿cations under a variety of assumptions on the nature of the optimization
policymakers undertake.
3 Flexible exchange rates: instrument rules
3.1 Simple Taylor-type rules
3.1.1 The dynamic system
In this section we simply assume that the policymakers in each country follow
Taylor-type policy rules given by
rt = ’￿￿t + ’y~ yt (6)












for the foreign economy, allowing the exchange rate to ￿ oat. Importantly, the
in￿ ation terms in these rules refer to domestic producer price in￿ ation (we
discuss other possibilities below). By substituting (6) and (7) into equations
(1) and (3), we can write the four equation system as follows. First, de￿ne
Zt = [~ yt;￿t; ~ y?
t;￿?
t]
0 along with Vt = [rrt;ut;rr?
t;u?
t]
0 : Then write the system
as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt (8)
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5We stay consistent with Bullard and Mitra (2002) in allowing for constant terms.






















and where Vt follows a vector AR(1) process with serial correlation given by
the scalar ￿:
3.1.2 Determinacy
Because the four variables in this system are free in the terminology of Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980), we require all eigenvalues of B to be inside the unit
circle for determinacy. Since B is block diagonal, this requirement means
that the eigenvalues of B11 and B22 must be inside the unit circle. From a
version of Proposition 1 in Bullard and Mitra (2002), this implies that the
following two conditions must hold for determinacy in this system:






￿ ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)’
?
y > 0: (10)
These conditions are versions of the Taylor principle6 for each country and
depend on the household discount factor ￿; on the policy parameters in the
Taylor-type rules in the two countries, and on the composite parameters ￿o
and ￿
?
o: We can write the composite parameters as
￿o = ￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)];
￿
?
o = ￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)]:
6See Woodford (2001) for a discussion.
9Thus the conditions (9) and (10) can be written as
￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)](’￿ ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)’y > 0 (11)
and
￿ [￿ + ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)](’
?
￿ ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)’
?
y > 0: (12)
The term in brackets is positive, so that if ’y = ’?
y = 0; the conditions state
that each central bank has to move nominal interest rates more than one-
for-one in response to deviations of in￿ ation from target. We have several
remarks on conditions (11) and (12).
First, the conditions for the two economies are not the same except in
the special case where policies are identical (in the sense that ’￿ = ’?
￿ and
’y = ’?
y) and ￿ = 1=2; which would be interpreted as the case that the
two economies are equally open.7 Otherwise, the degree of openness di⁄ers
and this translates into a di⁄erence in the two conditions. This means in
particular that identical policy in the two countries, in the sense of identical
values for the Taylor-type policy rule coe¢ cients, may be enough to meet
one determinacy condition but not the other.
Second, the policy parameters from a single country can only in￿ uence
one of the two conditions. Thus policymakers from each country must sep-
arately meet conditions for determinacy: Determinacy conditions for world-
wide rational expectations equilibrium are met, in some sense, ￿country by
country.￿
We interpret these ￿ndings as follows. If the home country policymaker
obeys the Taylor principle while the foreign policymaker does not, worldwide
equilibrium will be indeterminate. Should a sunspot variable begin to in￿ u-
ence expectations, then the foreign economy will endure endogenous volatil-
ity, but the home country will not due to the block diagonality of B which
indicates that there is no feedback between the two economies. The intuition
is that any international CPI in￿ ation di⁄erential will cause the nominal ex-
change rate to adjust, exactly o⁄setting the foreign in￿ ation problem, and
7If ￿ = 1
2, there is no home bias in consumption.
10exactly insulating the home country. This result relies heavily on the idea
that the two Taylor rules react to domestic producer price in￿ ation, which
has no imported component, as opposed to consumer price in￿ ation, which
does have an imported component. With CPI in￿ ation in the policy rules, or
with a ￿xed exchange rate, this will no longer be the case. We discuss these
possibilities below.
3.1.3 Learnability
We now turn to the learnability of rational expectations equilibrium for cases
where that equilibrium is unique. We allow the expectations in equation (8)
to initially be di⁄erent from rational expectations.8 The MSV solution of
equation (8) is given by
Zt = ￿ A + ￿ CVt
where the conformable matrix ￿ A is null and
￿ C = (I ￿ ￿B)
￿1 X:
We endow agents with a perceived law of motion
Zt = A + CVt (13)
where A and C are conformable. Using this perceived law of motion and
assuming time t information (1;rrt;ut;rr?
t;u?
t)
0 we can calculate
EtZt+1 = A + C￿Vt:
Substituting this into equation (8) yields the actual law of motion
Zt = B(A + C￿Vt) + XVt
= BA + (BC￿ + X)Vt:
8Preston (2003) considers deriving the fundamental equations of models in this class
assuming agents are learning. Under his interpretation of the microfoundations, the equa-
tions are altered and long-horizon forecasts matter. We think it would be interesting to
carry out an analysis of this type for the open economy case.
11We then de￿ne a map T from the perceived law of motion to the actual law
of motion as
T (A;C) = (BA;BC￿ + X):
Expectational stability is attained if the di⁄erential equation
d
d￿
(A;C) = T (A;C) ￿ (A;C)
is locally asymptotically stable at
￿ ￿ A; ￿ C
￿
. Results in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) establish that under weak conditions, expectational stability governs
stability in the real-time learning dynamics.
We use Proposition 10.3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) to calculate
the condition for expectational stability. According to the proposition, the
condition for expectational stability is that the real parts of the eigenvalues
of the matrices B and ￿B are less than unity. Because 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; we
need only check the real parts of the eigenvalues of B. Also, because of the
block diagonality of B, the expectational stability condition can be calculated
country by country, that is, via B11 and B22; and by a version of Proposition 2
in Bullard and Mitra (2002) yields conditions (11) and (12). This means that
both countries must meet the open economy version of the Taylor principle
in order for the world equilibrium to be learnable. It also means that the
conditions for determinacy are the same as the conditions for learnability in
the special case where both countries follow simple Taylor-type instrument
rules. This is known not to be true in general in models in this class with
alternative instrument rules, but it provides a good benchmark.9
3.1.4 Quantitative e⁄ects
As stressed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001, 2002), the nature of the
policy problem faced by each country in this open economy framework is iso-
morphic to the closed economy case, but there are nevertheless quantitative
9An example of a case in which determinacy and learnability conditions do not coincide
is when the policy authorities use a Taylor-type policy rule but react to lagged information
on in￿ ation and the output gap. See Bullard and Mitra (2002). For a wider variety of
Taylor-type instrument rules in a similar model, see Llosa and Tuesta (2005).
12consequences. Figure 1 illustrates. Here the calibration has been chosen so
that the domestic economy collapses to the one studied by Woodford (2003)
when the openness parameter ￿ ! 0: Woodford￿ s (2003) values have been
widely used and provide a simple benchmark. The discount factor ￿ = 0:99:
When ￿ ! 0; ￿o ! ￿ and we set this to Woodford￿ s value of ￿ = 0:157: The
coe¢ cient ￿o would correspond to a value of ￿o = 0:024 in the Woodford
calibration. When ￿ ! 0; ￿o ! 0 so that ￿ ! ￿ + ￿; and ￿o = ￿ (￿ + ￿);
with ￿ = [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)]=￿: We follow Woodford (2003) and set ￿ to the
nearly linear value 0:11: Given other parameters, this means that ￿ = 0:745
to obtain ￿o = 0:024:
The ￿gure plots (11) as a function of ’￿ and ’y using this calibration
for values of ￿ between zero and unity. Since (12) is the same condition
for the foreign country with ￿ replaced by 1 ￿ ￿; one can view the lines
in Figure 1 as representing this condition as well. The line labelled ￿ = 0
represents the case when the home country is closed and corresponds to the
condition from Bullard and Mitra (2002, their Figure 1). The determinacy
and learnability condition for the foreign country would then correspond
to the line labelled ￿ = 1 (that is, 1 ￿ ￿ would equal one if ￿ = 0).10
Thus the small open foreign economy would have to choose its Taylor rule
coe¢ cients to the northeast of this line in the ￿gure, while the large closed
home economy would only have to choose its Taylor rule coe¢ cients to the
northeast of the line labelled ￿ = 0: Failure of either country to abide by
its condition would produce indeterminacy and the possibility of sunspot
￿ uctuations in the world equilibrium. These lines are closer together if the
degree of openness ￿ is intermediate between zero and one, as illustrated by
the lines labelled ￿ = 1=3 and ￿ = 2=3: For ￿ = 1=2; the conditions for
determinacy and learnability in the two countries would be identical.
One of the main implications of Figure 1 is that the open economy lines
with ￿ greater than zero all lie above the closed economy line, so that con-
10Llosa and Tuesta (2005) focus on the small open economy and depict the same line in
their Figure 1 for their domestic in￿ ation rule, which would correspond to this case. Their
model is similar to the one used here and has a similar calibration.
13Figure 1: The conditions for determinacy and learnability when each mon-
etary authority uses a simple contemporaneous data Taylor rule. The more
open economy will have a steeper tradeo⁄ in the Figure.
14ditions for determinacy and learnability become more stringent when open
economy considerations are introduced. A central bank analyzing its econ-
omy as if it were closed might mistakenly chose Taylor rule coe¢ cients that
are too small to deliver determinacy and learnability of equilibrium.
3.2 Instrument rules with international variables
3.2.1 Consumer versus producer price in￿ ation
In Bullard and Schaling (2006) we show that instrument rules which include
responses to international economic conditions induce international feedback
between the two countries where there would otherwise be no such feedback.
In this section we brie￿ y summarize this argument. We begin by supposing
that each country pursues a Taylor-type rule featuring consumer price index,
or CPI, in￿ ation instead of domestic producer price in￿ ation.11 This is intu-
itively plausible as in an open economy CPI in￿ ation, not domestic producer
price in￿ ation, is often the variable of interest for the monetary authority.
The monetary policy rule in the home country is given by
rt = ’￿￿C;t + ’y~ yt; (14)













￿C;t = ￿t + ￿st (16)





t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st (17)
is foreign CPI in￿ ation, and where st is the terms of trade.12 The in￿ ation
targets of the monetary authorities implicit in these speci￿cations would then
11This is also the second rule analyzed by Llosa and Tuesta (2005) for their small open
economy analysis.
12In our two-country model following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002, p. 882) the home




F;t. Using the de￿nition of
15be in terms of CPI in￿ ation. Thus, responding to CPI in￿ ation is equivalent
to having a conventional Taylor-type rule augmented by a third term which is
the terms of trade. The terms of trade is in turn a re￿ ection of foreign output
via equation (5). The policymakers in each country are naturally reacting
to developments in the partner economy because some fraction of the goods
being consumed at home are being produced abroad. Thus the policymaker
reaction to CPI in￿ ation introduces international feedback between the two
countries that does not exist under Taylor-type rules with domestic producer
price in￿ ation.
As a consequence the key matrix B is no longer block diagonal (B12 and
B21 are no longer null). We stress that the loss of the block diagonality of
this matrix is induced by policy alone. Policymakers are reacting to con-
sumer rather than producer prices and this is creating international linkages
that would otherwise not exist. This means, in principle, that policy pa-
rameters in one country will in￿ uence all aspects13 of worldwide conditions
for determinacy and learnability. The separability of these conditions across
borders breaks down￿ in spite of ￿ exible exchange rates and PPP￿ because
the policymakers are reacting to variables that have foreign components. In
section 5 we consider the case where the home country irrevocably pegs its
exchange rate to the foreign currency, which is another rule that responds to
international variables and changes the implied form of the key matrix B.
the terms of trade St = PF;t=PH;t this equation can be written as PC;t = k￿1PH;tS
￿
t ,










. Taking logs of these equations yields pC;t = pt + ￿st and p￿
C;t = p￿
t ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)st. Taking ￿rst di⁄erences and normalizing the initial (t ￿ 1) price levels to zero,
these equations can then be rewritten as the home and foreign CPI in￿ ation equations in
the main text.
13That is, all four eigenvalues.
164 Flexible exchange rates: targeting rules
4.1 Overview
In this section we assume that the central bank sets policy optimally. This
means that the nominal interest rate is set according to a rule inferred from
an explicit optimization exercise.14 We investigate the benchmark case of
discretion15 and consider two implementation strategies of the ￿rst-order con-
dition along the lines of Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) (hereafter EH). The
various implementation strategies may or may not provide determinacy and
learnability of rational expectations equilibrium. In the next sub-section we
focus on the non-cooperative case in which each policymaker sets monetary
policy autonomously. We will turn to the cooperative case in Section 4.3.
4.2 Non-cooperative discretionary policy
4.2.1 The policy problem
Importantly, as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) mention, the correct in￿ a-
tion variable for the policymaker following a non-cooperative discretionary
policy is domestic producer price in￿ ation. This means ￿t will enter into
the objective for the domestic policymaker.16 Under discretion the monetary
authority will choose a sequence of current and future short-term nominal
interest rates to minimize loss de￿ned by












~ y ￿ ~ y
T￿2
] (18)
14For a recent discussion about targeting versus instrument rules see Svensson (2003),
McCallum and Nelson (2005), as well as Svensson (2005).
15For a discussion of determinacy issues for optimal rules in a closed economy where the
timing protocol is commitment, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b).
16The reason is that by targeting a combination of PPI in￿ ation and the domestic output
gap (in line with Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2002) ￿where the weight on the latter, ￿0 ,
is not free but given by ￿0 = ￿￿
￿ = ￿0
￿ , the policymaker actually mimics targeting CPI
in￿ ation ￿which in turn has its micro foundations in social welfare.
17with ￿ ￿
￿
￿ and ￿o ￿ ￿￿
￿ = ￿o
￿ , and where ￿T and ~ yT are target values
which we will often view as being zero. The parameter ￿ represents the price
elasticity of demand for intermediate goods in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002). The minimization is subject to
~ yt = Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
o (rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rrt); (19)
and
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿o~ yt + ut; (20)
where




ut = ￿ut￿1 + ￿t:
We can reformulate the problem above as choosing the indirect control vari-
able f~ y￿g
1
￿=t to minimize (18) where the central bank treats Et￿t+1 as given.














~ y￿ ￿ ~ y
T￿2
￿ ￿
￿￿t￿￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿E￿￿￿+1 ￿ ￿o~ y￿ ￿ u￿)
i
where ￿t and Et￿t+1 are state variables. The ￿rst order conditions are
@L
@~ yt
= ￿￿o￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
~ yt ￿ ~ y
T￿
+ ￿t￿o = 0; (21)
@L
@￿t




￿ ￿t = 0: (22)




~ yt ￿ ~ yT￿
. Using this result in (22)
yields








17For a discussion of the relative merits of dynamic programming and the Lagrange
method see Schaling (2001). For applications of the latter to a non-linear optimization
problem, and a regime switching model see Schaling (2004) and Bullard and Schaling
(2001), respectively.
18It is well-known in the closed economy literature that there are a variety
of strategies for implementing conditions like (23), and that these strategies
can have di⁄ering implications for determinacy and learnability. We now
turn to two implementations for the open economy model in order to see
how these results may or may not be altered.
4.2.2 An open economy expectations-based optimal rule
Combining the ￿rst-order condition (23) with equation (19) we obtain
Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1







(where rrt is the ex ante real interest rate rt ￿ Et￿t+1). This can be written
as








Et~ yt+1 ￿ ~ y
T￿
:
Substituting for ￿t from equation (20) we obtain








Et~ yt+1 ￿ ~ y
T￿
:
Eliminating output via (19) yields
rt ￿ rrt = ￿0;0 + ￿￿;0Et￿t+1 + ￿y;0Et~ yt+1 + ￿u;0ut (24)
























Equation (24) is an example of a targeting rule, as discussed for example
in Woodford (2003, pp. 290-295). This rule is an open economy version of
19what Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) call an expectations-based optimal rule.
By construction, it implements what Evans and Honkapohja label ￿ optimal
discretionary policy￿in every period and for all values of private expectations.
If ￿ ! 0 our (more general) open economy rule collapses to their version.
Setting the targets ￿T and yT to zero, the world economy can be written
as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt;
where Zt = [~ yt;￿t; ~ y?
t;￿?
t]




































Because B is block diagonal, determinacy conditions will be have to be met
















for the foreign economy. What we have in this section is di⁄erent from section
3.1.2 on determinacy of instrument rules. Although in both cases we have
a B-matrix that is block diagonal, under an Evans and Honkapohja (2003b)
style expectations-based optimal rule (adhered to in both countries), we have
unconditional determinacy of the two-country world economy. There is no
possibility of indeterminacy of the ￿ world equilibrium￿like we had in section
203.1.2. So, there is nothing like a Taylor principle that needs to be adhered
to.
Next, we turn to the learnability of the rational expectations equilibrium.
Because of the block diagonality of B, the expectational stability condition
can be calculated country by country, that is, via B11 and B22. By a version
Proposition 3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2003b), we ￿nd that for all para-
meter values the REE of the two-country world economy under world-wide
adherence to open economy expectations-based optimal rules is stable under
least squares learning by private agents. So, we ￿nd that the EH (2003b)
result that incorporation of observed private sector expectations into the poli-
cymaker￿ s optimal rule can overcome expectational stability problems carries
over to the two-country environment of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) if the
relevant rules are modi￿ed to take due recognition of open economy e⁄ects.
Other implementations of (23) are known to have poor properties with
respect to learnability and determinacy, however, and we now turn to this
case.
4.2.3 An open economy fundamentals-based optimal rule
A fundamentals-based policy rule implementing (23) generates a di⁄erent
reduced form. To obtain an optimal interest rate rule under rational expec-
tations conjecture a solution of the form
~ yt = a1 + d1ut;
￿t = a2 + d2ut;
21for the domestic economy, with an analogous conjectured solution for the
foreign economy. The MSV solution has
￿ a1 =













￿o (1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿o (￿￿;0 ￿ 1)
:
where ￿0;0; ￿￿;0; ￿y;0;￿u;0 are given by (25) through (28) respectively. The
policy feedback rule is then
rt =  0 +  uut + rrt; (29)
with
 0 = ￿0;0 + ￿￿;0￿ a2 + ￿y;0￿ a1
and
 u = ￿
￿
￿￿;0 ￿ d2 + ￿y;0 ￿ d1
￿
+ ￿u;0:
This is sometimes called the fundamentals form of the RE-optimal policy
rule. It is known that this interest rate rule is associated with indeterminacy
in the closed economy case.18
The world economy can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt;






















18See for instance Woodford (1999, 2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003).
22Determinacy requires ja0j < 1 and ja1j < 1 + a0 in v2 + a1v + a0 = 0;
the characteristic equation for B11 and B22; respectively. For the domestic
economy (and analogously for the foreign economy),
a1 =
￿(￿o + ￿o + ￿￿o)
￿o
and a0 = ￿: The condition ja1j < 1 + a0 is never met under maintained as-
sumptions and so worldwide equilibrium is indeterminate, as in the domestic
economy case discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003). The MSV solu-
tion will also be unstable in the learning dynamics. We conclude that the
method of implementing (23) will matter in the open economy case just as
it does in the closed economy.
4.3 Cooperative discretionary policy
4.3.1 Overview
As we have seen, block diagonality breaks down if policymakers put weight
on international variables in their policy rules, or, in a targeting approach, in
their objective function. That is exactly what happens should policymakers
in each country attempt to pursue the gains to cooperation which normally
exist in this model. We now turn to this issue.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) study cooperation in the context of their
New Keynesian model and are thus part of what Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
(2004) call second generation models of policy coordination. Canzoneri, et
al., state that the gains from coordination are larger in second generation
models than in ￿rst generation models.19
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) show in their Proposition 3 that gains to
international policy cooperation will accrue to both countries when ￿ > 1 and
each country follows a rule dictated by the solution to a joint optimization
problem. We now follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and discuss the
19For a survey of the lessons from the ￿rst generation literature see Nolan and Schaling
(1996).
23prospects for determinacy and learnability if each country attempts to pursue
the gains from cooperation.
4.3.2 The policy problem
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) de￿ne cooperation to mean that the two
central banks in the model agree to maximize a weighted average of the
utility of the home and foreign households under discretion. The weights
are naturally ￿ and 1￿￿: Both governments refrain from creating a surprise
appreciation, and hand out employment subsidies that just o⁄set the monop-
olistic competition distortion. The monetary authorities jointly maximize an
















































t and ~ y
?;C
t are the output gaps de￿ned under cooperation as the devi-
ation, in percent, of output from the cooperative steady state level for the
domestic and foreign economy, respectively.20
The ￿rst order conditions for this problem can then be written in terms
of standard output gaps as






















20For more details see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
244.3.3 One implementation
Combining these conditions with (1) and (3) gives optimal cooperative policy
rules





















# = 1 +




? = 1 +
￿￿?
o (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability The world econ-
omy can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt;
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25Determinacy properties will again depend on the eigenvalues of the matrix
B: The lack of block diagonality indicates that policy in each country will
in￿ uence determinacy properties. The four eigenvalues of B are given by
v1;￿ =

















These eigenvalues are independent of ￿, the degree of openness. This is
because the two economies are following a cooperative policy which takes






Unless the serial correlation in the shock is su¢ ciently large, this cooperative
policy will generate indeterminacy.21
We use the baseline calibration with the addition of ￿ = 7:88 implying
a markup of about 15 percent, and we report results for values of ￿. The
cuto⁄ value for the serial correlation parameter is ￿c ￿ 0:165:22 Values less
than this will create indeterminacy given the baseline calibration. Should
the shock process become something more like white noise, optimal policy
cooperation implemented in this way will be associated with indeterminacy.
21This is a version of a similar result for the closed economy in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003b).
22For ￿ = 2; ￿c ￿ 0:28:
26For determinate cases, we veri￿ed numerically at baseline parameter values
that expectational stability holds.
One might wonder if full cooperation is really a good positive model for
world monetary policy. In the international policy arena, we seem to observe
a variety of strategies in play. So far in the paper we have only considered
certain types of symmetry in policy, but there are also interesting asymmetric
situations. We now turn to one of these.
5 Fixed exchange rates: asymmetry in mon-
etary policy
5.1 An exchange rate peg
5.1.1 Overview
In this section we suppose the home country targets its nominal exchange
rate e vis-a-vis the foreign country. We assume the foreign economy sets
its monetary policy based on its own domestic considerations. The home
country gives up its domestic monetary autonomy in return for ￿importing
monetary stability￿from the foreign, anchor country.
This is a leading example of an asymmetric exchange rate regime, as
only the anchor country￿ s variables matter for its interest rate (depending
on the nature of the policy adopted there), and the home country simply
sets its interest rate to ensure it realizes a ￿xed exchange rate. The home
country in setting policy takes foreign monetary conditions into account, but
the foreign country need not incorporate the home country￿ s conditions in
its own monetary policy stance. This arrangement is similar to the regimes
adopted by some European countries prior to economic and monetary union
and to the present peg of the Chinese renminbi to the U.S. dollar.
275.1.2 The policy problem













The minimization is subject to
~ yt = Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
o [rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rrt]; (31)
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿o~ yt + ut; (32)
_
rrt = ￿oEt￿￿ yt+1 + ￿oEt￿y
?
t+1;
ut = ￿ut￿1 + ￿t;




st = (~ yt ￿ ~ y
￿
t) + ￿ st:
For ease of exposition we normalize the initial levels of the nominal exchange
rate and terms of trade at zero (et￿1 = st￿1 = 0), so that
et = st + ￿t ￿ ￿
?
t: (33)
In what follows we normalize the exchange rate target at zero (eT = 0). From
(30) the ￿rst-order condition then becomes et = 0, which combined with (33)
implies
st = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿
?
t): (34)
The intuition behind (34) is the following. The nominal exchange rate obeys
CPI-based purchasing power parity and, after appropriate normalization, is
given by et = ￿t ￿ ￿?
t + st. In order to prevent ￿ uctuations in et, the home
central bank should manipulate the terms of trade st, which it can a⁄ect via
the domestic output gap, in such a way as to o⁄set the GDP de￿ ator-based
in￿ ation di⁄erential. Thus we have (34).
28Since the terms of trade can be a⁄ected by the domestic output gap,
which in turn is a⁄ected by the home nominal interest rate, the home central
bank should try to achieve a level of the home output gap given by
~ yt = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿
?
t) + ~ y
?
t ￿ ￿ st: (35)
Equation (35) is obtained by substituting the expression for the terms of
trade into the ￿rst-order condition and rearranging.
5.1.3 The policy rule
Substituting (32) into (35), we obtain the home country￿ s optimal monetary
policy rule in terms of its indirect control ~ yt













(￿ st + ut): (36)
The home interest rate reaction function can be obtained by combining (36)
with (31) to obtain














u;0 (ut + ￿ st); (37)



















The rule (37) describes the optimal home monetary reaction function that
implements its monetary policy of pegging the exchange rate to the foreign
anchor country.23
We substitute the home country￿ s policy rule (37) into (31). This implies
~ yt = ￿
￿1














u;0 (ut + ￿ st); (41)
Here the dependence of home￿ s economic outcomes on the foreign macro-
economy is evident from the presence of the terms ￿?
t and ~ y?
t.
23We stress that there may be other ways to implement the ￿rst order condition for the
￿xed exchange rate.
295.1.4 The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability
Whether or not a ￿xed exchange rate regime is compatible with determi-
nacy of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium depends on how the for-
eign, anchor country implements monetary policy, and on any international
spillover e⁄ects on the home country. We make the assumption that the for-
eign, anchor country is inward-looking, and concerned only about reacting
to developments in its own economy. We proceed with the most straightfor-
ward assumption, namely that the foreign in￿ ation country follows a simple
Taylor-type policy rule. This allows us to easily study cases where the for-
eign, anchor monetary authorities are pursuing policies either consistent or
inconsistent with determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expec-
tations equilibrium.
The world economy can again be written in standard form. The matrix






where B22 is the matrix associated with a simple Taylor rule in use in the
foreign country. The eigenvalues there will depend on whether the foreign
country is following the open economy version of the Taylor principle or not,
as discussed earlier in the paper. The eigenvalues of B11 will also have to be
























We conclude that determinacy holds under maintained assumptions provided
the foreign, anchor monetary authorities are following the Taylor principle.
Learnability holds under the same conditions.
One may be able to imagine scenarios under which this result would break
down, if the foreign, anchor economy had some other policy. But this result
30suggests there need not be anything intrinsically unstable in the use of an
exchange rate peg.
6 Conclusion
We have developed results on determinacy and expectational stability for a
simple open economy New Keynesian model due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002). We used this model with an eye toward comparing the open economy
￿ndings to known results for closed economies under similar assumptions.
We have shown that even for simple Taylor-type policy rules, open econ-
omy considerations will have quantitative e⁄ects on determinacy and learn-
ability conditions. Closed economy analyses tend to understate the degree
of aggressiveness the policymaker must adopt to avoid indeterminacy and
expectational instability. Quantitative di⁄erences of this type are alluded to
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and are in accord with the ￿ndings of
Llosa and Tuesta (2005).
When central banks are inward-looking￿ reacting to domestic variables
in their policy rules￿ and when exchange rates are ￿ oating, our results indi-
cate that determinacy and learnability conditions for worldwide equilibrium
must be met country by country. This is true whether we are consider-
ing inward-looking instrument rules or targeting rules which are implied by
non-cooperative policy objectives. Optimal policy will require an implemen-
tation, but the natural implementations suggested in the closed economy
literature imply the separability of determinacy and learnability conditions
across economies. We interpret this ￿nding as follows. If one country out of
many adopts an instrument rule that is inconsistent with determinacy and
learnability, or one country out of many adopts an implementation of an
optimal policy which is inconsistent with determinacy and learnability, then
worldwide equilibrium will be indeterminate and expectationally unstable.
The remaining countries, even if they attempt to be very aggressive in pro-
moting determinacy and learnability, will not have an impact on this facet
of the world equilibrium. This might be viewed as an undesirable aspect of
31inward-looking policies, even if they are judged ￿ optimal￿on other grounds.
When monetary authorities are actively responding to international vari-
ables, our results indicate that determinacy and learnability conditions for
worldwide equilibrium are met by something akin to an average of world
monetary policy. This also occurs for targeting rules where monetary author-
ities are attempting to pursue cooperative policies to achieve the available
gains. Optimal cooperative policy will also require an implementation, and
the baseline implementation from the literature may not be consistent with
determinacy and learnability. Still, inclusion of reactions to international
variables allows the monetary authorities from a su¢ ciently large economy
to mitigate the threats of indeterminacy and expectational instability posed
by a partner country that is pursuing a poor policy, either through an ad hoc
policy or through an inadvertently bad implementation of an optimal policy.
The ability to in￿ uence these conditions may be viewed as a desirable aspect
of monetary policy in an open economy context.
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